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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The High Commissioner for Human Rights is the
principal human rights official of the United Nations.
The High Commissioner heads the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and
spearheads the United Nations’ human rights efforts.
OHCHR has a mandate to promote and protect
the enjoyment and full realization, by all people, of all
rights established in the Charter of the United Nations and in international human rights laws and
treaties. OHCHR is guided in its work by the mandate provided by the General Assembly in resolution
48/141, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent
human rights instruments, the Vienna Declaration
and Program of Action from the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, and the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document.
The mandate includes preventing human rights
violations, securing respect for all human rights,
promoting international cooperation to protect human rights, coordinating related activities throughout
the United Nations, and strengthening and streamlining the United Nations system in the field of
1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No
person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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human rights. Furthermore, the Office leads efforts to
integrate a human rights approach within all work
carried out by United Nations agencies.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Holding corporations liable for human rights
violations is fully consistent with international law.
At the heart of this case is the value we attach to the
idea of the rule of law, an idea expressed in the following simple statement: “Be you never so high, the
law is above you.” Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law 4
(2010) (quoting Dr. Thomas Fuller, 1654-1734).
The battle for subjecting human rights violators
to the rule of international law has been fought and
won against natural persons, groups, organizations
and States. On a proper understanding of contemporary international law, corporations are also subject
to the rule of law on the international plane, in which
they ubiquitously operate. Under that law, they are
accountable for human rights violations. In particular, corporations are not immune from responsibility
under international law if they engage in, or are
complicit in, conduct amounting to international
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity or
war crimes.
The United States has an obligation as a member
of the United Nations “to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization” to promote “universal respect for, and observance of,

3
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all....”
U.N. Charter art. 55-56. From the perspective of
international law, action by a State’s highest court
is equivalent to action by the State’s legislative or
executive organs: all are equally acts of the State. See
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 4(1),
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (“The conduct of any State
organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions....”).
Therefore, when this Court decides this case, the
Court is acting as an agent of the United States to
execute – or refuse to execute – the nation’s international legal obligation to promote human rights.
General principles of law common to domestic
legal systems throughout the world are an independent source of international law. Virtually every nation
in the world imposes civil liability on artificial persons for the tortious conduct of their agents. Hence,
the principle that corporations are subject to civil
liability for the wrongful conduct of corporate agents
is a general principle of law applicable by this Court
in cases presenting claims based on international law.
The proposition that corporations may be held
accountable for human rights violations pursuant to
the Alien Tort Statute is wholly consistent with
international law and is validated by the following
considerations. First, international law obligates
States to provide an effective remedy for victims of
human rights violations. Second, civil liability for

4
corporations helps promote the international legal
principle of ensuring accountability for human rights
violators. Third, in accordance with the principle of
complementarity, international law necessarily relies
on domestic legal mechanisms to ensure the effective
protection of human rights. Finally, civil liability for
corporations that are complicit in gross human rights
violations serves as an avenue for orderly redress
of grievances. Absent effective legal mechanisms to
provide remedies for victims of gross human rights
violations, those victims are likely to resort to extralegal measures to obtain redress for perceived wrongs,
thereby threatening the established legal and social
order.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

International Law Obligates States to
Provide Effective Remedies for Victims of
Human Rights Violations

International law requires States to provide an
effective remedy for breach of a right guaranteed by
international law. In the Factory at Chorzów case, the
Permanent Court of International Justice stated: “It is
a principle of international law, and even a general
conception of law, that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.” Factory at Chorzów (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13). Thus, under
widely accepted principles of customary international
law, an act or omission contrary to international law is

5
a “breach of an engagement” that triggers “an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.” Id.
Adequate reparation can take many forms, including
“[r]estitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear.” Id. at 47; see also
Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B.
Int’l Law Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/
Add.1 (Part 2).
A. Human Rights Treaties Obligate States
to Provide Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations
The principle of effective remedy, or effective
reparation, is a golden thread that runs through all
modern international human rights treaties. Professor Theo van Boven, an expert in the field of remedies
for violations of international human rights law,
explained the legal principle as follows: “As the result
of an international normative process the legal basis
for a right to a remedy and reparation became firmly
anchored in the elaborate corpus of international
human rights instruments, now widely ratified by
States.” Theo van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy
and Reparation: The New United Nations Principles
and Guidelines, in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity:
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making 21

6
(Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens
eds., 2009).
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights expresses this principle as follows: “Everyone
has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Similarly, article 2(3)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights obligates States “to ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy,” and “[t]o
ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
The principle of effective remedy is codified in
every significant international human rights treaty at
both global and regional levels. For example, global
human rights treaties that codify this principle
include the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 6,
Sept. 28, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660

7
U.N.T.S. 195;2 the Convention against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85;3 and article 83 of the
International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, art. 83, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.4
2

Article 6 states:
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their
jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through
the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination
which violate his human rights and fundamental
freedoms contrary to this Convention as well as the
right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as
a result of such discrimination.
3
Article 14 states:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that
the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has
an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a
result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.... Nothing in this Article shall
affect any right of the victim or other person to compensation which may exist under national law.
4
Article 83 states:
Each State Party to the present Convention undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any persons seeking
such a remedy shall have his or her claim reviewed
and decided by competent judicial, administrative or
(Continued on following page)

8
Regional human rights treaties that codify this principle include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by
Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, ETS No. 155);5 the American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 25 and 63, Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;6 and the Protocol to the
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.
5
Article 13 states: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
6
Article 25(1) states:
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse,
or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or
tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of
the state concerned or by this Convention, even though
such violation may have been committed by persons
acting in the course of their official duties.
Article 25(2) adds:
The States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any
person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by
the legal system of the state; (b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and (c) to ensure that the
competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.
Article 63(1) provides:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a
right or freedom protected by this Convention, the
(Continued on following page)

9
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, art. 25, July 11, 2003,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, available at http://www.
achpr.org/english/_info/women_en.html.7
B. The Practice of States and International Tribunals Supports the Principle of Effective Remedy
Under traditional principles of customary international law, the duty to make reparation for an
injury is inseparable from the concept of state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. See F.
V. García-Amador, Louis B. Sohn & Richard R. Baxter, Recent Codifications of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 8-9 (1974). Thus, a State
can be held liable both for the underlying breach of
an international human rights obligation and for the
failure to provide an effective remedy for that breach.
In recent years, international law has placed
great emphasis on reparation for victims of human
Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It
shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences
of the measure or situation that constituted the
breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that
fair compensation be paid to the injured party.
7
Article 25 provides: “States Parties shall undertake to: (a)
provide for appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or
freedoms, as herein recognized, have been violated; (b) ensure
that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by law.”

10
rights violations, especially for violations of international criminal norms. See, e.g., Int’l Comm’n of Jurists,
2 Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate
Complicity in International Crimes 6-7 (2008); Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in
the Making (Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009).
The Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy,
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 without
a vote, and hence reflecting the unanimous consent of
UN member states, reaffirms the right to an effective
remedy. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/496/42/PDF/N0549642.
pdf ?OpenElement [hereinafter, Basic Principles]; see
also UN Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, ECOSOC Res.
2005/30, ¶ 18 (July 25, 2005), available at http://www.
un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2005/resolution%202005-30.pdf.
This emphasis on reparation for victims is consistent with laws in national jurisdictions, which have
developed mechanisms for civil reparation for crime
victims to complement criminal punishment of human rights offenders. See Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the

11
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, ¶ 1 (1984),
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/
Html/116.htm.; Jo Goodey, Compensating Victims of
Violent Crime in the European Union With a Special
Focus on Victims of Terrorism 1 (May 2003) (discussion
paper for National Center for Victims of Crime), available at http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/
documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=32594.
Article 75(1) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) exemplifies these recent trends;
it requires the ICC to establish principles relating to
reparation for victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 75, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3. In contrast, statutes of older international
criminal tribunals were silent on reparation, except
that they empowered judges to order restitution of
property as an incident to a guilty verdict. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), art. 24(3), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
art. 24(3), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May
25, 1993); see also Antonio Cassese, International
Criminal Law 422-23 (2d ed. 2008).
Consistent with the other developments discussed above, the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights established a high level panel to prepare a
report and recommendations on reparation for women
victims of sexual violence in armed conflicts in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. See United

12
Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report of the Panel on Remedies and Reparations for Victims of Sexual Violence in the Democratic
Republic of Congo to the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (March 2011), available at http://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_Reparations_
Report_en.pdf.
C. Corporations are Not Exempt from the
Duty to Provide Effective Remedies
for Human Rights Violations
Although the general rule of effective remedy, as
a principle of international law, has its origins in
traditional doctrines of State responsibility, corporations are not exempt from the duty to provide effective remedies. Any exemption from the general rule
must be founded upon a rational theory that validates the exception. It cannot depend upon a casuistic
attempt to preserve or exploit an apparent loophole in
the law. Indeed, an exception for corporations cannot
be justified, either as a matter of common sense or in
terms of traditional or evolving principles of international law.
The term “reparation” has different meanings
under international law, as illustrated by the International Law Association’s Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of
Armed Conflict (Substantive Issues), 74 Int’l L. Ass’n
Rep. Conf. 291 (2010), available at http://www.ilahq.org/. In the first paragraph of article 1, the ILA
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Declaration defines ‘reparation’ to include “measures
that seek to eliminate all the harmful consequences of
a violation of rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict and to re-establish the situation that
would have existed if the violation had not occurred.”
Id. art. 1(1). The second paragraph of article 1 explains that the goal of reparation can be accomplished
by means of “restitution, compensation, satisfaction
and guarantees and assurances of non-repetition,
either singly or in combination.” Id. art. 1(2).
The ILA provisions are a synthesis of definitions
appearing in earlier international documents. The
earliest of these instruments, the ILC’s Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts provides as follows: “Full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act
shall take the form of restitution, compensation and
satisfaction, either singly or in combination....” Int’l
Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 34, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001).8 Similarly, the Basic Principles
8

The International Law Commission is a body of experts
created by the UN General Assembly and charged with the
“progressive development” and “codification” of international
law. Although the Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts are labeled
“draft articles,” the cited draft is the final version. The “Draft
Articles” are generally viewed as an authoritative expression of
customary international law. See James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility:
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002).
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and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law – as adopted by the UN
General Assembly, the UN Economic and Social
Council, and the Commission on Human Rights –
explains that the notion of “full and effective reparation” includes “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.”
See Basic Principles, supra, ¶ 18. In particular, the
Basic Principles also stipulate that “[i]n cases where
a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable
for reparation to a victim, such party should provide
reparation to the victim or compensate the State if
the State has already provided reparation to the
victim.” Id., ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
Thus, the proposition that corporations are not
accountable for violations of international human
rights law ignores a fundamental principle of international law: the principle that victims of human rights
violations are entitled to an effective remedy. Without
detracting from the value of other types of reparation,
it bears emphasis that the guarantee of nonrepetition is a method of reparation that underscores
the elementary flaw in the proposition that corporations are not accountable for international human
rights violations. If corporations could not be held
accountable, then corporations could continue to
violate human rights without any compelling need to
cease and desist; this is contrary to the principle that
reparation includes a guarantee of non-repetition. It
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would be more than an act of “passive injustice”9 to
accept such a grotesque interpretation of international law.
International law protects victims from human
rights violations committed by States, natural persons, and other types of organizations.10 See Phillipe
Sands & Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International
Institutions, ch. 15 (6th ed. 2009); see also Andrew
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State
Actors, 63-69 (2006). In these circumstances, a rule of
law exempting corporations from the same liability
for human rights violations that encumbers all other
actors in the international legal system would be a
brazen perpetuation of the axiom that “corporate
status has long implied economic and political power
without accountability.” David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 Stan.
Agora 1 (2001); see also Stephen Tully, Corporations
and International Lawmaking (2007) (especially
chapters 1 and 2). Such a state of affairs would be
intolerable in an international legal order that has
repeatedly emphasized the need for accountability for
9

As Judith Shklar helpfully reminds us, “passive injustice”
includes the silent acceptance of “laws that we regard as unjust,
unwise or cruel.” Judith N. Shklar, Faces of Injustice 6 (1990).
10
Juridical persons other than corporations also have obligations under international law. For example, in non-international armed conflicts, non-State armed groups are also bound
by international humanitarian law. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts
and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules 495-98 (2005).
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human rights violations. Corporations are not above
the law that binds every other participant in the
international legal system. In particular, a corporation cannot be permitted to commit genocide, crimes
against humanity or war crimes, given that every
other participant on the plane of international law is
prohibited from doing so.
In addition to the foregoing considerations, one
must at all times keep in view the clear pronouncement of the International Court of Justice: “Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right.”
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg.
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5). This is a straightforward application of Hohfeldian jural correlativity,
in which a right in someone entails an obligation for
someone else implicated in the violation. As a principle of international law, this simply means that the
person or entity implicated in the violation of the
right bears an obligation to make reparation for the
violation.
II.

Corporate Civil Liability Helps Promote
the International Legal Policy of Ensuring Accountability for Human Rights Violations

As a matter separate from international law’s
requirement that perpetrators of human rights violations must offer guarantees of non-repetition, there is
a clear international legal principle of promoting
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accountability for human rights violations already
committed.
The clear course of international human rights
law is to require accountability on the part of every
person or entity that enjoys recognition in international law. Elements of the principle of promoting
accountability include: state responsibility for human
rights violations; individual criminal responsibility
for gross human rights violations, see Rome Statute,
supra; complementarity of jurisdiction between
national judiciaries and international tribunals with
respect to gross violations of human rights, see id.;
and, responsibility of States and the international
community to protect persons from gross human
rights violations. See UN Secretary General, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A More Secure World].
The principle of promoting accountability has
moved international law to a point where it is taken
for granted nowadays that a State may be held accountable by way of civil remedies for any violation of
human rights attributable to it. It is, however, important to recall that this was not always the case. In
the first half of the twentieth century, States could
not be held accountable for the violation of their own
citizens’ rights, because notions of sovereignty prevented States from concerning themselves with what
was considered the internal affairs of one another.
How state officials treated their own citizens was
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then considered an internal affair of that State. See
Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 136 (2d ed. 2009).
With the development of modern international
human rights law after World War II, that objection
was overridden. See id. at 136-41. International law
now recognizes that the obligation to respect human
rights entails an incidental obligation of accountability owed to the whole world: an obligation erga
omnes, as the International Court of Justice stated.
See Barcelona Traction, supra at 32. The doctrinal
products of this obligation erga omnes include: the
idea of universal jurisdiction for the criminal prosecution of natural persons who committed gross human
rights violations, see, e.g., Luc Reydams, Universal
Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal
Perspectives (2003); the establishment of international criminal courts and tribunals; and, most recently,
acceptance of the doctrine that national authorities
and the international community have a responsibility to protect citizens from the most serious human
rights violations – namely, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. See 2005 World Summit
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005); see also A More Secure World, supra.
Just as international law has evolved to hold
States accountable for human rights violations,
international law has also evolved to hold specific
human beings accountable for gross human rights
violations. The Nuremberg defendants notably
argued that “international law [was] concerned with
the actions of sovereign States and provide[d] no
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punishment for individuals; and further, that where
the act in question [was] an act of state, those who
[carried] it out [were] not personally responsible, but
[were] protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of
the State.” The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (October
1, 1946), 446 [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
However, the judges of the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) rejected that argument, relying
significantly on the jurisprudence of this Court. See
id., at 446, citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
As part of its reasoning, the IMT delivered the following classic international legal dictum: “Crimes
against international law are committed by men, not
by abstract entities and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” Nuremberg Judgment, at
447. This judgment helped crystallize the international legal principle of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit in Kiobel
misinterpreted that classic Nuremberg dictum. The
point of the dictum was not to limit responsibility to
natural persons alone, as the Second Circuit suggested. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). Rather, the point was to reject
an argument of impunity by extending accountability
to the human defendants who claimed, like the corporate defendants in Kiobel, that they could not be held
accountable under international law.
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Indeed, the argument for impunity advanced by
the Second Circuit in Kiobel is remarkably similar to
the argument that the IMT considered and rejected in
the Nuremberg judgment. Notably, at the time the
Nuremberg Tribunal rendered its judgment, there
was not a universal practice of imposing criminal
responsibility on natural persons for violations of
international law. It is hard, therefore, to resist the
speculation that had the Second Circuit majority
dominated the bench of the IMT in 1946, they might
well have held that the individual defendants were
not accountable because, at that time, individual
criminal responsibility had not attained the status of
“a discernable, much less universally recognized,
norm of customary law,” just as they held in 2010
that corporations were not accountable because
corporate liability had not attained the requisite level
of universal practice. See Kiobel, supra, at 149. As
Judge Leval correctly observed in his concurring
opinion in Kiobel: “If past judges had followed the
majority’s reasoning, we would have had no Nuremberg trials, which for the first time imposed criminal
liability on natural persons complicit in war crimes;
no subsequent international tribunals to impose
criminal liability for violation of international law
norms; and no judgments in U.S. courts under the
ATS, compensating victims for the violation of fundamental human rights.” Id. at 153 (Leval, J., concurring).
As with States and natural persons, artificial
entities have not escaped legal censure for violation of
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international legal norms, including human rights
norms. There is no convincing reason to accept that
States and natural persons should be held accountable for gross violations of human rights, while denying similar accountability for business entities
organized as corporations. Indeed, business corporations never truly escaped accountability. As Judge
Posner correctly observed, writing for the Seventh
Circuit: “At the end of the Second World War the
allied powers dissolved German corporations that had
assisted the Nazi war effort ... and did so on the
authority of customary international law.” Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017
(7th Cir. 2011).
Moreover, other tribunals at Nuremberg explicitly recognized the liability of corporations for violations of international law in the judgments against
executives of IG Farbenindustrie and Krupp, two
corporations implicated in Nazi crimes. In the Krupp
case the Military Tribunal held as follows:
We conclude from the credible evidence before us that the confiscation of the Austin
plant based upon German-inspired antiJewish laws and its subsequent detention by
the Krupp firm constitute a violation of Article 48 of the Hague Regulations which requires that the laws in force in an occupied
country be respected; that it was also a violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations
which provides that private property must be
respected; that the Krupp firm, through defendants ..., voluntarily and without duress
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participated in these violations ... and that
there was no justification for such action.
United States v. Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under
Control Council Law No. 10, 1351-52 (1952).
In the I.G. Farben case, the Nuremberg Military
Tribunal held that the Farben conglomerate had
violated the prohibition of pillage under Article 47 of
the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of
War:
Similarly, where a private individual or a juristic person becomes a party to unlawful
confiscation of public or private property by
planning and executing a well-defined design
to acquire such property permanently, acquisition under such circumstances subsequent
to the confiscation constitutes conduct in violation of the Hague Regulations.... The result
was the enrichment of Farben and the building of its greater chemical empire through
the medium of occupancy at the expense of
the former owners. Such action on the part of
Farben constituted a violation of rights of
private property, protected by the Laws and
Customs of War. And in the instance involving private property, the permanent acquisition was in violation of the Hague
Regulations which limits the occupying power to a mere usufruct of real estate. The
forms of the transactions were varied and intricate, and were reflected in corporate
agreements well calculated to create the illusion of legality. But the objective of pillage,
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plunder and spoliation stands out, and there
can be no uncertainty as to the actual result.... With reference to the charges in the
present indictment concerning Farben’s activities in Poland, Norway, Alsace Lorraine
and France, we find that the proof established beyond a reasonable doubt that offences against property as defined in Control
Council Law No. 10 were committed by
Farben, and that these offences were connected with, and an inextricable part of the
German policy for occupied countries as
above described.
United States v. Krauch (The I.G. Farben Case), VIII
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
1131-32, 1140-41 (1952).
Therefore, although the International Military
Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to subject corporations to criminal liability, the Nuremberg judgments
made clear that corporations can be held accountable
under international law for gross human rights
violations committed by corporate agents on behalf of
a corporation. The fact that a particular tribunal
lacks authority to impose criminal punishment on
corporations does not contradict the proposition that
corporations can and should be held accountable for
violations of fundamental human rights norms.
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III. General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized Nations Support Civil Liability
for Corporations that Commit Serious
Human Rights Violations
The Statute of the International Court of Justice
directs the Court to decide cases in accordance with
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.” Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060,
33 U.N.T.S. 993. Similarly, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law directs U.S. courts to apply
“[g]eneral principles common to systems of national
law ... as an independent source of [international]
law. That source of law may be important when there
has not been practice by states sufficient to give the
particular principle status as customary law and the
principle has not been legislated by general international agreement.” Restatement (Third) of United
States Foreign Relations Law, §102 cmt. l (1987). This
Court has often consulted general principles of law to
establish a rule of decision in cases presenting claims
based on international law. See, e.g., Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1933); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163-80 (1820). Indeed,
this Court has previously relied on general principles
of law to support a finding of corporate liability for a
violation of international law. See First National City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 621-33 (1983).
Virtually every nation in the world imposes civil
liability on artificial persons for the tortious conduct
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of their agents. Hence, the principle that corporations
are subject to civil liability for the wrongful conduct
of corporate agents is a “general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations.” See Brief of Amici
Curiae International Human Rights Organizations
and International Law Experts in Support of Petitioners.
The Second Circuit majority in Kiobel completely
disregarded “general principles of law” as an independent source of international legal rules. Instead,
the majority focused exclusively on customary international law. However, treaties and customary international law are not the only sources of international
legal rules. The ICJ Statute identifies “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as an
important third source of international law, especially
when treaties and customary international law do not
provide clear answers to questions that arise in
litigation. See I.C.J. Statute, supra, art. 38(1)(c).
Therefore, the Kiobel majority erred by failing to
consult this important source of international law.
According to Professor Manley Hudson – a former Judge of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, former Harvard professor, and one of the
preeminent American international lawyers of his
generation – “general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations” are a source of international law
that:
empowers the Court to go outside the field
in which States have expressed their will to
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accept certain principles of law as governing
their relations inter se, and to draw upon
principles common to various systems of
municipal law or generally agreed upon
among interpreters of municipal law. It authorizes use to be made of analogies found in
the national law of the various States. It
makes possible the expansion of international law along lines forged by legal thought
and legal philosophy in different parts of the
world.
Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942 611 (1943). More succinctly,
Lord Phillimore, who proposed the formulation now
embodied in article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, had
explained general principles as those “accepted by all
nations in foro domestico.” Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals 25 (1994).
As a source of international law, general principles of law are derived directly from shared features
of municipal legal orders. They do not require an
intermediate process of uniform practice of States in
their relations with each other. Hence, general principles of law must not be confused with customary
international law, which depends on universality of
the practice of States oriented towards the international plane. According to Professor Bin Cheng, a
renowned authority on general principles of law as a
source of international law:
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In Article 38[(1)(a)] ... custom is used in a
strict sense, being confined to what is a general practice among States accepted by them
as law. General practice among nations, as
well as the recognition of its legal character,
is therefore required.... In the definition of
the third source of international law [general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations], there is also the element of recognition on the part of civilized peoples, but the
requirement of general practice is absent....
The recognition of these principles in the
municipal law of civilized peoples, where the
conception of law is already highly developed, gives the necessary confirmation and
evidence of the juridical character of the
principle concerned.
Bin Cheng, supra at 24.
In a recent case before the International Court of
Justice. Judge Simma applied this approach in his
separate opinion and “engaged in some research in
comparative law to see whether anything resembling
a ‘general principle of law’ within the meaning of
Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the Statute of the Court
can be developed from solutions arrived at in domestic law to come to terms with the problem of multiple
tortfeasors.” Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J.
161, 354 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Simma)
(emphasis added). On the basis of the recognition of
the principle of joint and several liability in the
municipal law of both common law and civil law
jurisdictions, Judge Simma concluded “that we find
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ourselves here in what I would call a textbook situation calling for such an exercise in legal analogy.” Id.
A. Application of General Principles in
this Case Promotes Justice
The preceding argument demonstrates that, in
the absence of treaty or custom, general principles of
law derived from municipal law offer a rich source of
principles of law and justice in the international
sphere. The usual concern in relying on general
principles of law as a source of international law has
always been that their application may lead to distortion or injustice in particular cases. See, e.g., 1
Oppenheim’s International Law 37 (Robert Jennings
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). Naturally, any
concern about distortion or injustice would then
require specific and rational considerations that
engage reasonable apprehensions. Corporate civil
liability for human rights violations engages no such
concern. To the contrary, a ruling that corporations
cannot be held liable for human rights violations
would be unjust: since corporations have extensive
rights under international law, it makes no sense to
exempt them from liability when they violate the
rights of others.
International law has long recognized that
corporations have legal personality, which entails
certain rights and responsibilities. In the recent case
of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the ICJ dealt with the
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question of corporate personality and its consequences as follows:
The Court notes that the Parties have referred frequently to the case concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain). This involved a public limited company whose
capital was represented by shares.... As the
Court recalled in the Barcelona Traction
case, “[t]here is ... no need to investigate the
many different forms of legal entity provided
for by the municipal laws of States.” ... What
matters, from the point of view of international law, is to determine whether or not
these [corporate entities] have a legal personality independent of their members.... In
determining whether a company possesses
independent and distinct legal personality,
international law looks to the rules of the relevant domestic law.
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo),
Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 190, 194 (May 24)
(emphasis added).
Indeed, in the Barcelona Traction case itself, the
first case in which the ICJ addressed the concept of
corporate personality, the Court clearly recognized
that “[t]hese [corporate] entities have rights and
obligations peculiar to themselves.” Barcelona Traction, supra, at 34. Similarly, in his commentary on
corporations in international law, Professor Peter
Muchlinski observed:
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The act of incorporation creates a legal person separate from the owners and managers
of the underlying enterprise. This allows for
the creation of a separate capital fund to be
applied for the purposes of the corporation,
in that the corporation acquires the right to
own its own assets, to enter into contracts in
its own name, to pledge its assets to creditors, and to be held liable for its actions.
Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in International Law,
in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, online edition (Rudiger Wolfrum ed.,
2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.
mpepil.com. There is therefore no question that
corporations have obligations for their own errors in
international law.
In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court recognized the tremendous influence of corporations in
international affairs. The Court noted “the profound
transformations which have taken place in the economic life of nations.” It then added: “These latter
changes have given birth to municipal institutions,
which have transcended frontiers and have begun to
exercise considerable influence on international
relations. One of these phenomena which has a
particular bearing on the present case is the corporate entity.” Barcelona Traction, supra, at 33.
Speaking about the need to accord corporations
recognition in international law, the ICJ continued as
follows:
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In this field international law is called upon
to recognize institutions of municipal law
that have an important and extensive role in
the international field. This does not necessarily imply drawing any analogy between
its own institutions and those of municipal
law, nor does it amount to making rules of
international law depend upon categories of
municipal law. All it means is that international law has had to recognize the corporate
entity as an institution created by States in a
domain essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.
Id. Thus, according to the ICJ, international law
recognizes that corporations have the powers, duties
and liabilities assigned to them by domestic law.
Naturally, to protect the rights of these municipal
institutions that have transcended frontiers and
exerted such considerable influence in international
relations, “calls for a transparent, stable, and predictable investment environment have given rise to
specialized rules of international law that offer protection to the assets of corporate investors among
others.” Muchlinski, supra, ¶ 5. Hence, a robust
subset of international law has developed – including
international commercial arbitration, investment
disputes and mixed claim courts – to protect the
rights of corporations.
It would then be highly inappropriate to maintain that corporate rights – as opposed to corporate
liabilities – are the only jural correlative that flows
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from international law’s recognition of corporate
personality as an incident of the “general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.” There is no
rational basis for such a conclusion. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice flatly
negates such a position. So, too, do many international instruments that have imposed legal obligations on
corporations. See Harold Hongju Koh, Separating
Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 263 (2004) (providing a
useful summary of these instruments). The claim
that international law grants corporations rights
without liabilities amounts to a distortion of the idea
of corporate personality.
B. The Absence of an International Forum to Enforce Corporate Criminal
Liability is Irrelevant
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit claimed that the
absence of criminal responsibility for “juridical persons” in the ICC Statute resulted from a rejection of
the idea during treaty negotiations, thus suggesting
that international law is inclined to grant immunity
to corporations for human rights violations. See
Kiobel, supra, at 119. This claim lacks evidentiary
support. There is contrary information indicating
that criminal responsibility for juridical persons,
which had been in earlier drafts of the Statute,
disappeared from the final document because “time
was running out,” not because of a deliberate choice
to exclude it. See Per Saland, International Criminal
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Law Principles, in The International Criminal Court:
The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results 189, 199 (Roy Lee ed., 1999).
Regardless, it is clear that several States Parties
to the ICC Statute have included corporate criminal
responsibility in municipal legislation they adopted to
implement the ICC Statute. These parallel trends in
national legal systems provide further evidence of a
“general principle of law recognized by civilized
nations,” which supports corporate criminal liability
for egregious human rights violations.
For example, corporations and other private legal
persons can be prosecuted for genocide and crimes
against humanity under Article 213-3 of the French
Penal Code. If a corporation is found guilty, it can be
dissolved, barred from exercising its functions for a
certain period, fined, or ordered to make reparation.
Additionally, the French government has the power to
confiscate part or all of the corporation’s assets in
accordance with Articles 131-39 and Article 213-3 of
the French Penal Code. Moreover, Article 689-11 of
the French Code of Penal Procedure, as amended in
2010 to implement the ICC Statute, authorizes
French courts to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity and genocide committed abroad by
French nationals, including both French corporations
and natural persons.
In Canada, section 2 of the Criminal Code and
section 1 of the Criminal Code Amendment Act (2003)
define the term “persons” to include both human
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beings and corporate entities. The Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act, which enables the
operation in Canada of the norms contained in the
ICC Statute, provides: “Every person is guilty of an
indictable offence who commits: (a) genocide; (b) a
crime against humanity; or (c) a war crime.” Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, c. 24, ch. 4(1)
(2000) (Can.). Moreover, section 2(2) of that statute
states: “Unless otherwise provided, words and expressions used in this Act have the same meaning as
in the Criminal Code.” Id. at 2(2). Thus, Canadian
national law authorizes criminal prosecution of
corporations that commit crimes covered by the ICC
Statute.
In Australia, the Criminal Code “applies to
bodies corporate in the same way as it applies to
individuals” with “modifications ... made necessary by
the fact that criminal liability is being imposed on
bodies corporate.” Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 12.1(1)
(Austl.). Moreover, a corporation may be found guilty
of any offence, including an offence punishable by
imprisonment. See id., § 12.1(2). Division 268 of the
Australian Criminal Code proscribes “genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes
against administration of the justice of the International Criminal Court.”
Ultimately, though, an objection founded on a
perceived absence of a strong norm of corporate
criminal responsibility in international law amounts
to a mere smoke screen. The caution seen in the
domestic realm in the area of corporate criminal
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responsibility has never restricted the civil liability of
corporations for the tortious conduct of their agents.
There is no doubt that domestic legal systems were
once hesitant to impose criminal liability on corporations. See Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal
Responsibility (2d ed. 2001); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 13.5 (5th ed. 2010); Sara Sun Beale, A
Response to Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability,
46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1481, 1493-95 (2009); Andrew
Weissmann et al., Reforming Corporate Criminal
Liability to Promote Responsible Corporate Behavior
(U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Oct. 2008).
That initial hesitancy was inspired by notions of
moral autonomy and personal responsibility for
criminal conduct. See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of
Criminal Law, 146-54 (6th ed. 2009). However, the
cautious approach to corporate criminal liability has
never previously been thought to provide a rationale
for restricting the civil liability of corporations for the
wrongful acts of their agents. See Beale, supra, at
1481; see also Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, 3 Report of the
ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in
International Crimes (2008).
IV. Corporate Civil Liability is Consistent
with the Principle of Complementarity
Between International and Domestic Legal Regimes
Applying the Alien Tort Statute to impose civil
liability on corporations for international human
rights violations is wholly consistent with the
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principle of complementarity between domestic and
international legal regimes. All major international
human rights treaties require States to take the
necessary steps – consistent with their domestic legal
systems and with the provisions of that specific treaty
– to adopt the measures necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the particular treaty.
Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights illustrates this point. That
article states: “Where not already provided for by
existing legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.” ICCPR, supra, art. 2(2). Similar
provisions are included in: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra, art. 6; the Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra, art. 14(1); the
International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, supra, art. 83; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 2-8, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2 & 4,
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; the Optional Protocol
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to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 1, 3 & 4, May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. No.
13,095, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227; the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, art. 4(2),
6(1) & 6(3), May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,094, 2173
U.N.T.S. 222; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 4, 7 & 8, Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3; and the International Convention for
the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 3, 4 & 6, May 1, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 441.
None of these treaties excludes corporations from
the set of persons whom the State is required to
regulate for the purpose of achieving complete protection of international human rights.
The principle of complementarity – which emphasizes national legal mechanisms as important
instruments for enforcing both treaties and customary international law – is a rule of both necessity and
good faith among nations, given the dearth of international mechanisms for enforcing international law.
See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of
International Law: Insights from the Theory & Practice of Enforcement 328 (2008).
The principle of complementarity that is consistently found in contemporary international human
rights treaties comports fully with what Vattel described as a mutual duty of nations to support and
promote the international order as the “society of the
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human race.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Charles G. Fenwick trans.), Book II, chap. I, at
113-14 (1916). By virtue of this principle of customary
international law, nations “owe one another all the
duties which the safety and welfare of that society
require.” Id. at 113.
An interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute that
encompasses corporate liability for violations of
international human rights law, in accordance with
ordinary U.S. domestic principles of corporate liability, is indeed an essential component of the complementarity between international law and its
enforcement through domestic legal mechanisms.
V.

Corporate Civil Liability is Consistent
with the Idea of Orderly Redress of
Grievances According to the Rule of Law

Finally, it is worth recalling recent events involving people who sought extra-legal solutions because
they felt excluded from the rule of law. Such events
reveal the folly of those who would place corporations
beyond the rule of law when they are implicated in
gross international human rights violations. Indeed,
such events call to mind a crucial forewarning that
motivated the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948 – an instrument correctly
described by the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill as
“the great post-war statement of principle associated
with the name of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.” Tom
Bingham, The Rule of Law 6 (2010). The Universal
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Declaration expressed that warning in the following
terms: “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human
rights should be protected by the rule of law.” Universal Declaration, supra, Preamble. It would be mistaken to consider that oppression, in the manner of gross
human rights violations, is the preserve of wicked
governments, never effected or supported by powerful
corporations.
Here, one recognizes the accuracy of the observation that “legal theory will never be as precise as
physics.” Thomas Smith, The Uses and Abuses of
Corporate Personality, 2 Stan. Agora 69, 70 (2001).
International law certainly shares this shortcoming,
perhaps more so than any other branch of law. Yet
international law, despite its imperfections, must be
allowed a continued role as an avenue for orderly
expression and resolution of grievances, in order to
deny the powerless an excuse to resort to illegitimate
means of settling scores with the powerful. In answering the question about the raison d’être of international law, Martti Koskenniemi reminds us that
international law:
provides the shared surface – the only such
surface – on which political adversaries recognize each other as such and pursue their
adversity in terms of something shared, instead of seeking to attain full exclusion –
‘outlawry’ – of the other. Its value and its
misery lie in its being the fragile surface of
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political community among social agents –
States, other communities, individuals – who
disagree about social purposes but do this
within a structure that invites them to argue
in terms of an assumed universality.
Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?,
in International Law 89, 110-11 (Malcolm D. Evans
ed., 2003).
These considerations surely demonstrate the
short-sightedness of the strategy of putting corporations beyond the rule of international law. It is simply
not in anyone’s best interest, least of all the corporations themselves.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, corporations should
not be exempt from tort liability under the Alien Tort
Statute for violations of the law of nations such as
torture, extra-judicial killing and crimes against
humanity.
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